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TennisOne Lessons 
Defeating the Undefeated Tactical Extrapolations of the Canas-Federer Matches for Every-day Players Philippe Azar
For the second week running, Roger Federer, the undisputed world number one has been beaten by Guillermo Canas, a player ranked outside the top 50.
Let's not make too much of Federer’s defeat at Indian Wells a couple of weeks ago. It will certainly go down on paper as one of the all-time great upsets, considering how much of a favorite Federer was to win that match (never mind the whole tournament) but - as he wisely remarked himself - it had to happen some time, it’s not the end of the world and it’s an opportunity to start all over again. However, if you get beaten twice in a row by the same player – as was the case when Canas beat him again one week later in the Florida Masters - the excuse of an “off-day” wears thin (especially in the case of a Federer) and one could almost consider it as the beginning of a trend. Both matches were fascinating. In my opinion, Federer did not play badly in either one but was simply outplayed, outfoxed, outrun, and outthought by Canas on both occasions. It gave us – the weekend hackers – hope that however good the opponent is, there is always a chance – however remote – that an unlikely victory is possible. It showed us that going into a match with a specific and smart game plan can phase even the most undefeatable of opponents. For the purposes of this essay, I want to explore how Canas’s tactics and psychology can be extrapolated and applied to players of all levels. Let's set the scene. In Indian Wells, Federer arrived on a 41 match winning streak. He had not lost a match since August 2006. His only defeat in recent memory to a top 10 player came at the hands of Rafael Nadal in last year’s French Open final (and there is no shame in that). He had already won every tournament he had entered since August 2006, including the Dubai tournament the week prior to Indian Wells. He was the undisputed world number one and the disputed all-time greatest player. Canas, on the other hand, was ranked at number 60, had lost in the qualifying of the event and only got into the main draw as a Lucky Looser. He had only been back on the tour since September 2006 after a 15-month drug ban. To deny that he was favorite to win that match against Canas is as controversial as arguing that Wimbledon is not played on grass. Admittedly, Canas is a former top 10 player, having won 7 main tour titles, including one this year (not to mention 4 Challenger events since his return) and was on a “hot-streak” but nothing of the caliber of Federer’s achievements.
By the time they were set to rematch in Miami, all those facts meant nothing. Anyone who had seen Federer’s defeat in Indian Wells could foresee that another defeat was not just possible, but probable. So, what is it that Canas does so well against Federer? The first important lesson we learned is that reputation and stats counts for nothing in the heat of the match. Regardless of how good the opponent is, regardless of how many matches and tournaments he or she may have won, you cannot afford to let your performance be influenced by reputation alone. If Canas had really paid that much attention to Federer’s achievements (as so many of his opponents do), he might as well have stayed home and watch the cows come home. Instead, I suspect that his mindset in his first match against Federer was, “He’s got to loose some time. Today is as good a day as ever,” and in his second match, “If I can beat him last week, I sure as heck can do it again this week.” It takes a certain arrogance but you don’t win by doting on your opponent. Be a kind person but don’t be a kind player. Federer is a great shot-maker. Probably the best there is and arguably the best there has ever been. One of his strengths lies in choosing the right moment to go for a winner rather than attempt them indiscriminately a-la-Philippoussis. Canas on the other hand is quite possibly the second best retriever (after Nadal) on the tour. His basic tactic is Get The Ball In One More Time Than The Opponent. There is a fundamental rule around which all matches are either won or lost: it is impossible to lose a point if you can get the ball in more often than your opponent. And, in both matches against Federer, Canas personified that principle. Especially in Indian Wells where, as the match progressed, Federer became increasingly frustrated at Canas’s ability to retrieve every shot and felt compelled to take more risks and go for increasingly unlikely winners that invariably turned into unforced errors. What do we learn from that? A great retriever will always beat an indiscriminate shot maker. Canas stuck to his guns and accepted that Federer will probably hit a few winners over the course of the match but not enough to beat him.
Sometimes, an opponent’s greatest weakness is his greatest strength. Ask anyone in the business and they will tell you that Federer’s forehand is one of the most feared shots in tennis. It is a simply sublime shot that combines power, direction, depth, and spin for deadly results. But Federer’s forehand imploded in Indian Wells. Canas had a clear idea in mind, namely to break down his opponent’s strength by hitting as much as possible to it and hope that Federer becomes overly-conscious. No doubt about it: it’s a risky strategy that can backfire but, if it works and you manage to neutralize your opponent’s best weapon, he or she will probably not have much else to fall back on. And such was the case with Federer. As the match progressed, he was making more unforced errors off of his legendary forehand than his backhand. The last time I saw such a forehand meltdown was in the French Open 2006 final against Nadal. Federer tried his B-plan of coming into the net against both Nadal and Canas but that was only paying lip service. By that time, he seemed demoralized. And - rest assured - the guys in the locker room have taken note of this meltdown: I’m willing to bet there will be a lot more guys willing to attack Federer’s forehand - when wisdom up to now had dictated attacking his backhand. The reality is that Federer’s opponents have been playing to his backhand so much over the past few years, that it has now almost become a strength. In his Roddick semi-final at this years Australian Open, Federer hit more backhand winners than forehands. Furthermore, did anyone notice that Canas consciously hit his attempted winners towards Federer’s forehand side? The principle is sound. Your opponent will usually anticipate that your winners will be aimed to their weaker side and will shift their weight accordingly in that direction – in the case of Federer, the backhand side. If the ball is instead played in the opposite direction (the forehand side), your opponent will often be caught flat-footed. Federer is one of the best retrievers in his own right and one of the all time greats in converting defensive positions into offensive opportunities. But he found himself flat-footed on several occasions. An Angle Begets an Angle If you hit an angle to your opponent, expect the angle to come back. Canas is a clay court specialist (though he obviously plays very well on hard courts too). His mind is bent towards angles. He lured Federer into hitting angles by playing a lot of his balls down the middle and then mopped the floor with his retorts. Players fall in two categories: they either like to play balls on the run (Venus Williams, Rafael Nadal) or they prefer balls to come to them (Andy Roddick, Maria Sharapova). Federer did not grasp onto the fact that, if you face an opponent who likes to hit angles and can generate them at will as Canas does, do not hit one to him in the first place. Instead keep the ball deep and down the middle. If there is just one blatant weakness in Federer’s game, it’s his forehand volley and he hit some crucial forehand volley errors. Canas did a great job of exploiting that weakness. To be honest, Federer is in good company: there are very few players at any level that can claim to have a solid forehand volley. Most players know how to slice a backhand from the baseline and are therefore able to apply the same principle on the volley (minus the swing) but very few players have a good slice forehand, hence a poor forehand volley. Given the choice, Canas aimed for the forehand volley knowing that there is a higher likeliness of the shot breaking down under pressure. And it did.
Truth be known, every player has a “bête noire:” an opponent who, on paper, they should be able to beat but end up getting beaten repeatedly instead. Marat Safin sobs at the prospect of playing Fabrice Santoro, and Federer’s former nemesis used to be Nadal but it seems that Canas might well become the new one. The common denominator between Canas and Nadal is that they are both excellent retrievers. Federer’s head to head with both of these players stands at 1 to 3 and 3 to 6 respectively in favor of them. Federer will need to carefully re-evaluate and analyze his own strategy against classy retrievers because the Canas’s and Nadal’s of the world are plenty and are here to stay. Federer has done a pretty good job of beating the battalion of retrievers on the tour so far but Canas has given them all a new psychological lease of life. And so, what is the moral of these two losses? These kinds of unlikely victories give us all hope that nothing is ever lost. The wonderful thing about sport is that anything can happen in the heat of a competition. Canas taught us the most important of all lessons. It doesn’t matter how good your opponent is and how unlikely it is that you might walk off court victorious, the result is never a given. The match is never finished until that very last ball goes out of play. As Connors famously once said "I've never lost a match. But I have run out of time before I figured out a way to win." Just like Canas did on Federer, aim to impose so many problems that your opponent runs out of time solving them. Your comments are welcome. Let us know what you think about Philippe Azar's article by emailing us here at TennisOne.
Philippe Azar is a professional with Peter Burwash International (PBI) and has been teaching tennis internationally for more than 15 years. He is presently based at Tokyo Lawn Tennis Club in Japan. PBI contracts with resorts, hotels and clubs all over the world to direct tennis programs.The company presently has professionals working at 62 facilities in North America, Europe, Asia, Middle East, Caribbean, Pacific and Indian Ocean. During its 30 years in business, PBI tennis professionals have taught tennis to over three million students in more than 135 countries. For more information visit: pbitennis.com |
