10 Tactical Mistakes and How to Avoid Them

Paul Fein

Despite being a 7-1 underdog against Jimmy Connors in the 1975 Wimbledon final, Arthur Ashe was brimming with confidence. “When I walked on court I thought I was going to win. I felt it was my destiny,” recalled Ashe.

What made this huge underdog so sure he was destined to win? A shrewd strategy conceived on the eve of the final with the help of friends Dennis Ralston, Erik van Dillen, Donald Dell, Marty Riessen, Charlie Pasarell, and Freddie McNair. The objective was to bring out the worst in Jimmy’s game by concentrating on his assorted weaknesses even if that meant abandoning Ashe’s formidable, if not always reliable, power game.

Since baseline-basher Connors was awesome against rocket-server Roscoe Tanner in his 6-4, 6-1, 6-4 semifinal rout, Arthur adopted a totally different strategy. Rather than slugging it out—just what Jimmy craved—he would serve wide on both sides and often at three-quarter pace (for added swerve), feed him low balls down the center to exploit his shaky forehand approach shot, softly slice forehands and backhands during rallies, and throw up plenty of lobs to the backhand side.

The game plan worked as Ashe adroitly executed his new stratagem to the letter. The flustered Connors had only his old plan of blasting back pace with even greater power. But there was little pace coming at him, and his inflexible game plan and stubborn character only hastened his disintegration in the first two sets. Ashe weathered Connors’ aggressive comeback in the next two sets, neither changing his well-conceived plan nor cracking under pressure.

The brilliant strategy helped produce a stunning 6-1, 6-1, 5-7, 6-4 upset and demonstrated the supreme importance of tactics.

Forty years later, even elite pro players make basic tactical mistakes, just as Connors did by not changing a losing game. Here are 10 common tactical mistakes that can sabotage your game—along with advice about how to avoid them.

Being too Predictable

All-time great John McEnroe rightly avers, “The worst thing you can do in sports is be predictable.” Serving and volleying is a dying art today, but it was de rigueur for men’s grass-court tennis back in 1969. In his quest for a second Grand Slam (his first came in 1962), Rod Laver devised a smart tactic for his US Open quarterfinal against Cliff Drysdale, a longtime nemesis.

“My plan was to vary my net-rushing,” Laver recalled in his autobiography, The Education of a Tennis Player. “Sometimes I’d stay back when I served, which is almost unheard of in championship men’s tennis on grass.” The tactic worked and the suddenly unpredictable Laver prevailed against Drysdale and went on to win Wimbledon. Two months later, he captured the US Open for his second Grand Slam, a feat no other player has achieved.

Another legendary lefty, baseliner Rafael Nadal, used this tactic opportunely in the greatest tennis match ever played, his 6-4, 6-4, 6-7, 6-7, 9-7 epic triumph over Roger Federer in the 2008 Wimbledon final. Down 0-15 in the final game, Nadal served and volleyed for the first time in the 4-hour, 48-minute marathon and punched a backhand volley for a winner.

Surprising your opponent by serving and volleying once in a while can still prove highly effective, as Nadal showed. Even if you don’t try this tactic, you should mix up the speed, spin (slice and kick), depth, and placement of your serves to keep your opponent off balance and confused. You can also vary your position, moving closer to and farther from the center strip, depending on your serve and your opponent’s returns. But do it subtly.

You should also vary your passing shots to keep the net-rusher guessing. Andy Murray nearly always hits his passing shots crosscourt, while world No. 1 Novak Djokovic and Nadal are more versatile and unpredictable.

Finally, if you’re a defensive-minded player, surprise your opponents with some offensive moves. And if you’re offensive-minded, keep the enemy off-balance with the occasional change-of-pace shot and lob.

Change a Losing Game

“Never change a winning game. Always change a losing game,” advised astute champion Bill Tilden long ago. It remains the most famous and respected maxim in tennis.

But at what point in a match should you change a losing game? “You have to determine whether it’s the game plan or the execution of the game plan that’s not working,” points out former world No. 4 Gene Mayer, one of the smartest 1970s−1980s players. “You have to give it sufficient time while the tactics are executed reasonably well. The decision to change tactics is based on an extended pattern of losing games, not just a few points.” 

When power hitter Petra Kvitova trounced Eugenie Bouchard 6-3, 6-0 in the 2014 Wimbledon final, the pattern was extended and unmistakable, but Bouchard never changed her losing game. “Bouchard needed to acknowledge that the bigger weapons were on the other side of the net,” says Mayer. “Variety and finesse would have brought better results for Bouchard rather than sheer power and returning serve from inside the baseline. The goal is to win the match, not stay in your comfort zone. Great champions dig deep, accept reality, and do what is necessary to come out on top.”  

How should you change tactics? “Every player needs to go on the court with at least Plan A, B, and C,” recommends Mayer, who has coached Fabrice “The Magician” Santoro and doubles star Leander Paes. “If Plan A does not work, normally the plan with the highest chance of success that is conservative is the best choice.” After Djokovic thoroughly outplayed Nadal 6-3, 6-3 in the 2014 Miami final, he revealed part of his strategy was to drill crosscourt backhands to Nadal’s forehand. “I had a few game plans,” said the Serb. “I wanted to get out there and see what works the best. He serves and likes to move to the backhand corner. He runs around his backhand, so that he opens the court for his opponent on forehand side.” In sharp contrast, Nadal had no Plan B or C to counteract Djokovic’s tactics and paid a heavy price.

Should you ever change a winning game? “Not every winning game remains a winning game,” notes Mayer. “Strategic changes or improved play by an opponent sometimes require you to change to another game plan.” Ivan Lendl’s 3-6, 2-6, 6-4, 7-5, 7-5 comeback victory over McEnroe in the memorable 1984 French Open final might have been such an occasion. Should McEnroe have continued to serve and volley on every point on the slow clay after he began to miss more first serves and volleys and Lendl started passing him more often to turn the tide? McEnroe confided the heartbreaking setback haunts him to this day.

Using the Inside-In Approach Shot

“The inside-in forehand is without a doubt the worst tactical error I see,” says Robbie Koenig, a leading Tennis Channel analyst. “The inside-in forehand approach to another right-hander’s forehand loses the point 8 out of 10 times, I reckon. Players think they can place the shot away from their opponent on the baseline, but the fact that they are approaching over the highest part of the net and into the least amount of court always hurts them.”

Former world No. 1 Andy Roddick often resorted to hitting an inside-in approach shot. But the inside-in forehand approach shot is almost always suicidal.

Besides those two high-risk factors, the inside-in approach forces the attacker to run near his backhand sideline, way out of position. The most notorious offender was former world No. 1 Andy Roddick.

Whenever he went inside-in against Federer, the Swiss maestro nonchalantly flicked a forehand crosscourt passing shot winner into the vast open court.

Interestingly, Federer himself committed the same unpardonable sin, on match point no less, against Andreas Seppi at the 2015 Australian Open. Federer later said he shouldn’t have let Seppi’s pinpoint passing shot go by him, but he overlooked his predicament. Federer hit a fast-paced inside-in forehand approach from outside the singles sideline. That left him scrambling to get into a decent position at net and also to get balanced enough for a split step. Not surprisingly, he achieved neither goal. As a result, he couldn’t change direction and somehow leap to hit a backhand volley.

The in-side forehand can be a devastating weapon—if you get into position early and your opponent is out of position. But the inside-in forehand approach shot is almost always suicidal.

Your Lob Can Be the Start of a One-Two Punch

Every time you lob very deep, think offensively. Because your lob will likely land within a yard of your opponent’s baseline, your opponent can’t hit a powerful smash, and he may not even be able to reach your lob. Your opponent is now running backward and in trouble. You can turn defense into offense—but only if you seize the opportunity.

So, if you’re sure your opponent's shot can’t hurt you, immediately sprint forward. You will often wind up with an overhead or a high volley you can put away. Nothing is more tactically satisfying than turning defense into offense.

Easier said than done, you think. Not really. The first key is to hone your lob so that you can hit it very deep, whether you’re with the wind or against it. (How often do you even practice the lob?) Lob to your opponent’s backhand side, which increases the odds he’ll have to hit a less-powerful backhand overhead or decide to let the ball bounce. The second key is simply to anticipate and then recognize this situation. The third key is to dash forward to your ideal destination about six to ten feet from the net, depending on your height and quickness.

Failing to take advantage of two perfect lobs may have changed the course of the 1964 Davis Cup Challenge Round in Cleveland. With the defending champion U.S. leading Australia 2-1 and on the verge of clinching the Cup, Dennis Ralston had a break point on Fred Stolle in the fifth set. On two successive points, Ralston didn’t seize the net after a wonderful lob. He lost both points and eventually the match 7-5, 6-3, 3-6, 9-11, 6-4. Australia went on the regain the Cup, 3-2.

You’ve probably seen players, even pro players, fail to capitalize on a deep lob. Don’t make the tactical mistake they do.

Failing to Absorb Your Opponent’s Power

Falstaff said, “The better part of valor is discretion.” Either out of pride or ignorance, players often try to blast back the most powerful shots of their opponents, and as a result, make wild errors. These players fail to acknowledge that their opponents’ power adds to their own power, all other things being equal. And the significantly increased total power is frequently difficult to control.

By absorbing some of your opponents’ power, you can defuse and control their fast shots at the same time. Watch how Agnieszka Radwanska, Angelique Kerber, and Caroline Wozniacki deal with booming, deep groundstrokes. They quickly get into position, bend down quite low to increase their stability, shorten their backswing to avoid contacting the ball late, grip the racket firmly to prevent mis-hits, and most important, moderate the racket head speed, rather than accelerate rapidly as they normally would.

Federer and Nadal take some of those important steps, too. But these two preternaturally athletic champions are more ambitious and aggressive. They don’t want merely to avoid an error and return the ball deep. They want to “counter-attack” as much as they can. Therefore, they often don’t decrease their normal racket speed. Federer and Nadal manage to control the oncoming power chiefly by increasing their topspin.

Unless you have the talent of Roger and Rafa or superb hand-eye coordination and soft hands, copy the tactics and technique of Aggie, Angie, and Caro.

Going For Too Much or Too Little Placement

“Hit for the lines,” Harry Hopman, the legendary Australian Davis Cup coach, used to tell his players. The advice was intended to boost their confidence and remind them to play aggressively. World-class players can place the ball with extraordinary accuracy. That accuracy results from several factors, including topnotch strokes and footwork, precise timing, and awareness of their court position and the resulting geometric possibilities for each shot.

Lesser players typically make two tactical mistakes regarding shot placement. First, they hit too many groundstrokes and volleys in the middle third (laterally) of the court. Hitting up the middle is for the warm-up when you’re collaborating. When the match starts, you’re competing. So hit the ball into either of the outer thirds of the court to force errors, run her ragged, and crush her spirit.

The second tactical mistake is the opposite: hitting balls much too close to the sidelines and committing needless and costly errors. Generally, target your shots no closer than three feet from the sidelines and baseline. The exceptions to this rule fall into two extreme situations. When you’re pressured and must thread the needle for a passing shot, you should aim two feet or even less inside the sideline. And when your opponent hits a weak shot—soft, shallow, and/or in the middle of the court laterally—you can aim closer than three feet to the sideline if you have the requisite skill.

Standing in “No Man’s Land” or Way Too Deep

“No Man’s Land” is the area between the service line and three to four feet inside the baseline. Its colorful nickname is apt because if you position yourself there, balls will often land at your feet, and your half-volleys or rushed groundstrokes will often result in weak returns and errors. While “No Man’s Land” is no place to hang out, it’s an ideal place to attack from and transition through if the oncoming shot is soft and short enough.

Positioning yourself too deep—more than two feet behind the baseline during rallies—is the reverse tactical mistake. It hurts your chances to play offensively, and it forces you to do too much running, particularly against crosscourt shots. Early in his under-achieving career, Gael Monfils positioned himself so deep that he did little damage offensively during rallies. If you play five or more feet behind the baseline, unless you’re Nadal, you face yet another major problem. You have to constantly figure out how to keep your shots deep when hitting the ball from several different defensive spots, e.g., 5, 10, and 15 feet behind the baseline. That’s because you have to keep adjusting the power, trajectory, and spin—no easy task.

So “hold your ground” near the baseline, except when a very powerful and very deep shot forces you back two or three feet. Conversely, when you push your opponent deep behind the baseline, you can move onto the baseline or even a bit inside it. Federer, who anticipates superbly, is the paragon of baseline positioning.

Missing Opportunities to Attack

In his 1925 classic, Match Play and the Spin of the Ball, Tilden noted, “In singles the main error of many players is the lack of knowledge of when to defend and when to attack.”

Ninety years later, Tilden’s critique still holds true. “A huge tactical blunder is allowing the opponent to get back to neutral when they are on the defensive and you see the opponent is going to buy time with a floater return,” points out 1980s doubles superstar Pam Shriver, now an ESPN analyst. “Instead of letting the ball bounce, take it in the air and fire it into the open court.  It’s a split-second decision that is too often missed at all levels.” During the Open Era, Martina Navratilova, McEnroe, and Federer best displayed tactical acumen and split-second decisiveness to pounce on and put away those floaters.

Every short, weak groundstroke should be attacked with a power shot, an approach shot, a sharp angle to pull your opponent off the court, or a well-disguised drop shot. Your shot selection should depend on your strengths, the weaknesses of your opponent, the surface, your court position, and the score. For example, drop shots from just inside the baseline on big points can backfire badly on hard courts against speedy opponents, as world No. 1 Djokovic has learned.

Finally, don’t forget to attack second serves that lack power, spin, placement and/or depth. Watch how Serena Williams, Maria Sharapova, Kvitova, and Djokovic pummel wimpy second serves and how opportunistic Federer chips and charges against them. Different strokes for different folks!

Not Playing the Percentages

Most players don’t serve to the outside corner of the service box in the deuce and ad courts often enough. For years, supposed “experts” wrongly claimed this tactic is risky because the net is about two inches higher for wide serves. That’s a very minor negative for three reasons: players are taller than ever and thus serve with a higher trajectory, skilled servers err by hitting the ball beyond the service line and not into the net, and kick serves clear the net by a wide margin anyway.

Far more consequential is that the percentages go substantially against the receiver of wide serves in four crucial ways. First, when she contacts the ball in the alley or outside of it, she starts the point way out of position. Contrast that with a serve landing in the middle of the court, leaving the receiver in the ideal position. Second, a down-the-line serve return must clear the highest part of the net, about 5 ½” inches higher than the 36” height at the middle of the net. Third, if the receiver contacts the ball late, she will err in the alley. Fourth, receivers positioned more than five feet behind the baseline, like Nadal, risk hitting short returns because their shots must travel so far diagonally.

The premier wide servers featuring slice serves today are Federer and Czech lefty Lucie Safarova, who pull opponents way outside the alley. Bullet-serving, 6’10” John Isner and Serena hit both wide corners of the service boxes with terrific power, accuracy, and consistency.

Approaching the net with a crosscourt forehand or backhand stands out as the most common low-percentage tactic. Surprisingly, Navratilova, the greatest woman volleyer in history, committed this blunder regularly, and it cost her many points, particularly against the topspin crosscourt passing shots of No. 2-ranked Andrea Jaeger in the early 1980s. Unless you can hit a winner or near-winner crosscourt, you should approach the net with down-the-line and very deep shots.

Trying shots you haven’t mastered, especially on big points, is high-risk, low-percentage tennis. This often applies to difficult touch shots like the drop volley and drop shot. Even superstar Serena can’t execute them well. But it can also apply to topspin lobs, powerful second serves, and down-the-line backhands, which for the most part, even superstar Federer avoids. You may not have mastered certain shots yet, but much of the fun and challenge of tennis derives from developing these shots in practice and then trying them in competition, first against inferior opponents.

What about exciting trick shots like the between-the-legs, back-to-the-net shot? Watch how rarely the pros win the point with this crowd-pleaser. When you’re in a desperate spot, throw up a high lob, and you’ll win far more points than you might imagine.

Not Adapting to the Surface

“Today has been a big eye opener. I was trying to play hard-court tennis on clay,” admitted Serena, after a tense, grueling 4-6, 7-6, 6-3 Fed Cup victory over Italian clay-court standout Sara Errani in April. “I need to go home and really train. I’m totally not as ready for the clay-court season as I thought I was. … Next time I’ll be really, really ready and I’ll know what to expect. So I have to play and be ready to hit a thousand shots if necessary.”

Serena enjoyed a huge 70-7 lead in winners, but committed 61 unforced errors, nearly three times as many as the super-steady, 15th-ranked Errani, whom Serena had beaten in their seven previous matches. Even after competing 17 years on the pro tour and winning the French Open twice, Serena still hasn’t learned that clay play is a different ball game. Serena’s awesome power was blunted on the slow clay in Brandisi, Italy, while the savvy Errani used her higher-percentage, heavy topspin groundstrokes to handle the strong winds better than Serena.

Power still pays off on clay, just not as much as on grass and hard courts. Clay requires special weapons: drop shots (which Serena lacks), drop volleys, angles, change of pace and spin, and the skills to handle those shots from opponents. Equally important, clay demands patience, the stamina to run for long rallies for three or more hours, smart shot selection, and a fighting spirit that will be tested more than ever.

Grass, the other specialized surface, also rewards players who adapt to it. The 1930s champion Don Budge realized his Western forehand was ill-equipped to handle low, skidding balls on grass, which was then the predominant surface. After Budge reverted to his original Eastern grip, his game improved markedly, and he captured tennis’s first Grand Slam in 1938. Bjorn Borg and Nadal both started their careers chiefly as teenage clay-court stars. They kept their Western forehands, but on grass hit them with less topspin and more power, adding power to their serves, and generally playing more aggressively. Borg surprised and silenced skeptics by winning five Wimbledon titles, while Nadal has grabbed two so far.

Hard courts, because of their predictable bounces and medium speed, require the least adaptation. Study the tactics and technique of Nadal on clay and Federer on grass, and incorporate them as much as you can into your game on those specialized surfaces.

To err is human. But smart players on every competitive level avoid these tactical errors. They seldom beat themselves, so they can more often beat their opponents.

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Paul Fein

Paul Fein has received more than 30 writing awards and authored three books, Tennis Confidential: Today’s Greatest Players, Matches, and Controversies, You Can Quote Me on That: Greatest Tennis Quips, Insights, and Zingers, and Tennis Confidential II: More of Today’s Greatest Players, Matches, and Controversies. Fein is also a USPTA-certified teaching pro and coach with a Pro-1 rating, former director of the Springfield (Mass.) Satellite Tournament, a former top 10-ranked men’s open New England tournament player, and currently a No. 1-ranked Super Senior player in New England.