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TennisOne Lessons 
Winning and Losing Tactics at Wimbledon Paul Fein “Perfect style, inexhaustible stamina, and the best strokes are of no avail, if the brain that governs the hand is not able to plan moves by which winning strokes may be achieved.” − Anthony Wilding, 1910-13 Wimbledon champion The Amazing Crosscourt For decades, tennis coaches have touted the crosscourt groundstroke as the great Rallying Shot in singles. It clears the lowest part of the net and travels diagonally over the longest possible distance. Those pluses significantly decrease the odds the crosscourt shot will go into the net, land in the alley or fly beyond the baseline. That advice remains true and timeless. But in 2009 the high-percentage crosscourt offers much more. It serves as the great Set-up Shot Weapon.
In his Tennis Channel piece, former touring pro Justin Gimelstob analyzed why Roger Federer’s game is ideally suited for grass. Gimelstob praised the six-time Wimbledon champion’s precise and speedy movement which gives him plenty of time for a vast array of options. Federer’s versatile shotmaking enables him to capitalize on these options which he exploits by means of various one-two combinations. The assault culminates with a knockout punch. Gimelstob mentioned how Federer cleverly uses the backhand slice to force his opponents to hit up which sets up his forehand for the coup de grace. Philipp Kohlschreiber, the only player to take a set off Federer before his spectacular Wimbledon final against Andy Roddick, summed up the Swiss maestro by saying, “He has an answer for everything.” Kohlschreiber was mainly referring to Federer’s improvisational wizardry and breathtaking athleticism. But like Gimelstob, he didn’t quite zero in on Federer’s single most important tactic: the crosscourt forehand. What makes Federer’s crosscourt forehand so deadly? First, he takes into account where on the court he’s hitting the ball from. He knows he can create greater angles A) the more inside the baseline he is and B) the farther he is, laterally, from the center of the court. Since Federer is adept at hitting “inside-out” forehands from the backhand side of the court, he actually has two crosscourt forehands, each aimed at opposite sides of his opponent’s court.
Second, the Federer crosscourt combines precise accuracy and controlled power. He generally targets a spot about three feet from the sideline, and he varies the shot’s depth. The depth depends on the degree of the angle he can create based on the aforementioned geometry. Most typically, he initially puts his opponent on the defensive with a deep crosscourt that lands about three to five feet inside the baseline. That offensive shot often elicits a slightly weaker reply lacking depth, placement or power, or some combination of these shortcomings. Of course, sometimes it takes three or more shots for the relentless Federer to tighten the noose on his opponent. Then Federer pounces on the weak return to create an even sharper angle with his next forehand.
Third, the key to achieving this precise accuracy and controlled power is topspin. Federer can produce 27 distinct variations of his forehand, according to experts who have studied hundreds of hours of video. Many of these slight variations relate to the variables of power, placement, and topspin to execute this crosscourt tactical theme. Federer’s goal is to push his opponents into or wide of the doubles alley and/or far behind the baseline (particularly against players who are poorly positioned to start with, such as Gael Monfils and the pre-2008 Roddick). After his prey is way out of position, Federer belts the ball into the open court to produce either an outright winner or to force an error from his scrambling, out-positioned foe. ESPN analyst Pam Shriver pointed out the predicament the out-of-position retriever faces during Tommy Haas’s 7-5, 7-6, 4-6, 6-3 mild upset over fourth-seeded Novak Djokovic at Wimbledon. On a big point, a superb Djokovic shot pulled Haas wide of the sideline and far behind the baseline. Shriver rightly said, “Haas either had to go for a winner or buy time [with a topspin shot landing very deep to recover his position]. And Haas did neither.” Instead, the German veteran hit an ordinary shot that enabled Djokovic to easily stroke a backhand winner into the open court. The dilemma is even more worrisome for Federer’s opponents because he is so fast that he can get to attempted winners and then quickly flick a sharply angled winner of his own before his opponents can recover their position. When Martina Navratilova asked Boris Becker what his strategy would be against Federer, the three-time Wimbledon champ said: “Roger likes to have a lot of time. He likes to be in control. He likes to control the center of the court. (Italics added.) I would serve and volley, and sometimes on the second serve and not give him time. I would take more chances on his serve. Once you get in a rally with him, you are inferior. You have to take control of the match early.”
Becker could have also pointed out that you have to take control of the point early – for the crucial reason he gave: Federer superbly controls the center of the court and dictates the point thereafter. In a nutshell, it’s a matter of space and time. Federer controls the space and takes away his opponents’ time. Of course, 20 years
after Becker served and volleyed devastatingly on grass (and to a lesser degree on hard courts), today no serve and volleyers of his caliber ply their specialized skills. Even if they did, the caliber of groundstrokes has improved significantly, so fortune no longer favors the brave serve-volleyers the way it once did. Finally, Federer maximizes this crosscourt tactic yet another way: on his serve. He racked up a stunning 50 aces in his epic 5-7, 7-6, 7-6, 3-6, 16-14 Wimbledon final victory, and many of them, as well as other formidable serves that Roddick failed to return, were placed in the outside corners of the deuce and ad court service boxes. So, even when Roddick could return them, he started the point in or outside the alley and typically also behind the baseline. Since Roddick found himself in an almost indefensible position, Federer unsurprisingly won a terrific 89 percent of his first serve points (113 of 127). Since pro tennis has evolved away from serving and volleying with high-powered baseliners in the ascendancy, how can The Mighty Fed be stopped? What tactics are necessary, assuming his opponents have the talent, technique, and brainpower to implement them?
Rafael Nadal, 13-7 lifetime against Federer, did it by unrelentingly pounding vicious topspin crosscourt lefty forehands to the Swiss’s relatively weak backhand and thus dictating most of the baseline exchanges. Equally versatile Murray, 6-2 versus Federer, prefers to change pace to keep Federer off balance and then suddenly sneak attack. “I rarely lose matches [by] having let the other guy play his natural game,” boasts Murray. Guillermo Canas whipped Federer twice within a month in early 2007 by hitting the ball extremely deep and preventing Federer from attacking him. Gilles Simon defeated Federer twice in 2008 when he artfully defended and then ripped lots of backhand crosscourt winners whenever Federer’s crosscourt backhands were even slightly weak. Federer, who leaves no stone unturned in his physical, technical, and strategic preparation for matches, watched videos of two previous matches against Robin Soderling during the evening before their French Open final. Analyzing videos of Federer matches should be required study for world-class players and their coaches. And when competing against Federer, these players should attempt his effective tactics before Federer does that to them. Crosscourts, for all their many merits, do come with one major liability. When they are hit short – and not angled acutely – they land in the middle of the court both laterally and in terms of depth. These weak crosscourts are easy prey for Federer who quickly anticipates and pounces to strike a winner, near-winner, or highly aggressive approach shot. The Haas Strategy
Major injuries have intermittently derailed 31-year-old Haas during his career, but when healthy and in form, he resembles a lesser edition of Federer with a wide repertoire of shots. Haas extended Federer to five sets at the French Open and rightly predicted the key to their Wimbledon semifinal would be who won the big points. Federer, as usual, won them, especially in a 7-3 first set tiebreaker, and prevailed 7-6, 7-5, 6-3. Nonetheless, Haas’s strategy of keeping Federer off-balance was well-conceived, if not always well-executed. First, Haas mixed up his serving by sometimes serving and volleying. That surprise tactic, directed at Federer’s weaker backhand, produced some high, floating returns that gave Haas easy volleys. Second, Haas mixed up the placement of his first serves, targeting fairly often Federer’s dangerous forehand with effective, wide-swerving slice serves in the deuce court. Third, Haas occasionally gambled with some big second serves. Fourth, Haas went for some winners on his groundstrokes. Fifth, Haas moved in and attacked Federer’s second serve, which is certainly not weak, and approached net. The Murray Strategy Since I’m not privy to the Murray brain trust, I don't know if the 22-year-old Scot's performance in his eagerly awaited semifinal against Roddick was the result of misguided strategy or nervousness. While TV analyst Mary Carillo said that Roddick’s 6-4, 4-6, 7-6, 7-6 triumph “was the most complete, intelligent match I’ve ever seen Roddick play,” some of that success was due to the fact that Murray played one of his most unintelligent and incomplete matches. Murray owns one of the best service returns on the tour, but against Roddick, he was timidly chipping one-handed backhand returns and even occasionally pawing slice forehand returns. At 4-5 with Roddick serving in the fourth set, a frustrated Murray yelled at himself, “Hit the return!” after his short, floating return was easily put away by a Roddick forehand.
Second, instead of hitting his powerful and technically superior two-handed backhand during rallies, Murray aimlessly sliced one-handed backhands. Third, Murray averaged only 87 mph on second serves, which didn’t even have a pronounced or tricky spin. Roddick smartly attacked some of those hanging curveballs. Fourth, Murray inexplicably stroked loopy, medium-speed forehands that landed short and up the middle. The net results of this strangely passive and timid strategy was that he failed to make the slower and less athletic Roddick run much, and he allowed Roddick to dictate most of the backcourt exchanges. Roddick seized his opportunities by coming to the net 75 times and winning 48 points there. Murray also lacked power on his passing shots and hit too many of them predictably crosscourt. Indeed, the only reliable weapon in his arsenal was his first serve, which averaged 120 mph and produced 25 aces, four more than Roddick. Finally, Murray’s lack of aggressiveness prevented the wildly partisan British crowd from getting into the match and buoying their hero. Murray should go back to the drawing board and conclude that someone with his imposing 6’3”, 185-pound physique, splendid strokes and abundant talent should play The Big Game on grass and hard courts. If he wants to play finesse tennis and toy with opponents, as Miloslav Mecir did 20 years ago, he’ll wind up with Mecir’s record: a mere two Grand Slam final losses. The Roddick Strategy How can one not admire the fighting spirit of Andy Roddick whose career has gradually gone downhill since he won his only Grand Slam title at the U.S. Open and ranked No. 1 in 2003? He reached his last major final at the 2006 U.S. Open and saw his year-end ranking steadily drop to No. 8 for 2008, and yet he overcame nagging doubts that he would rejoin the elite. After ousting Murray in the Wimbledon semis, Roddick confided, “To be honest, the last couple of years, I didn’t know if I’d ever get a chance to play for another Grand Slam title. Now I get to, and it’s a dream.”
Roddick’s strategy was first to serve huge, which he did by averaging 127 mph on first serves and whacking 27 aces and 62 other unreturnable serves, and vary the placement of his serve, including serving into Federer’s body. It worked. Roddick held serve for 37 straight times, and the only time he was broken came in the 30th and last game of the deciding set. While awesome serving has long been Roddick’s main weapon, highly regarded coach Larry Stefanki had streamlined his backhand, improved his baseline and volleying positioning, and induced him to lose 15 unwanted pounds that had slowed him. Indeed, the resurgence of Roddick both before Wimbledon – he reached the Australian semis and the French fourth round, his best showing there – and during his matches before the final impressed observers. “He’s playing with an intensity and assurance,” noted John McEnroe before the final. “He’s playing with more options. He has more of a chance than people think.” Unlike Murray, Roddick was determined to go down swinging, if Federer, who boasted an 18-2 career record against him, were to beat him for the fourth time at Wimbledon. Roddick’s second tactic was to hit stronger backhands and direct them more often down the line, both during rallies and on passing shots, to keep Federer honest. Third, to break Federer’s serve, the slower and less clever Roddick had to shorten backcourt rallies and rush the net when he could. That worked, too. Roddick approached net 69 times, 10 more than Federer, and won a respectable 61 percent of those points (though he missed a pivotal high backhand volley on set point in the second set tiebreaker). Until the last game of the marathon, Roddick earned the only two service breaks, which enabled him to win the first and fourth sets. On the debit side, Roddick still commits occasional tactical errors, such as approaching net from too deep a position. That forced him to first-volley from the service line. He also ran around to hit forehand approach shots from near the alley on his backhand side. That maneuver allowed Federer to pass him easily into the wide-open half of the court. Finally, the popular American also should have played more balls to Federer’s weaker backhand, especially during crucial points in fluctuating deuce, ad-in and ad-out games and throughout both tiebreakers. During the high-caliber 30-game deciding set – which broke the previous record for the longest fifth set at a Grand Slam event set at the 1927 French Championships by 10 games – John McEnroe commented, “Roddick is not even close to the player who lost 18 times to Federer.” That compliment sums up the new and improved Roddick. If he fine tunes his tactics, the 26-year-old Roddick may yet win another major title, and it could come at the U.S. Open in two months. Your comments are welcome. Let us know what you think about Paul Fein's article by emailing us here at TennisOne.
Paul Fein Paul Fein, a USPTA teaching pro and former top 10-ranked New England men’s open player, has won more than 20 writing awards. His 2002 book, Tennis Confidential: Today’s Greatest Players, Matches, and Controversies, published by Brassey’s, Inc., was listed No. 1 among tennis books by Amazon.com and BN.com. Information about the book and how to order it can be found at www.tennisconfidential.com. His second book, You Can Quote Me on That: Greatest Tennis Quips, Insights, and Zingers, was published by Potomac Books, Inc. (formerly Brassey’s, Inc.) in 2005 and was listed No. 1 among tennis books by Amazon.com and BN.com. For more information, visit www.tennisquotes.com. His third book, Tennis Confidential II: More of Today’s Greatest Players, Matches, and Controversies, was published April 28, 2008 and was featured on the home page of Amazon.com. |
